Exploring the Shadows of America’s Security State (Or How I Learned Not to Love Big Brother) Reprinted from TomDispatch.com courtesy of Haymarket Books by McCoy, Alfred W.
Class, Race and Corporate Power
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 2
2018
Exploring the Shadows of America’s Security State
(Or How I Learned Not to Love Big Brother)
Reprinted from TomDispatch.com courtesy of
Haymarket Books
Alfred W. McCoy
University of Wisconsin-Madison, awmccoy@wisc.edu
DOI: 10.25148/CRCP.6.1.007545
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/classracecorporatepower
Part of the History Commons, and the Political Science Commons
This work is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts, Sciences & Education at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Class, Race and Corporate Power by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
dcc@fiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
McCoy, Alfred W. (2018) "Exploring the Shadows of America’s Security State (Or How I Learned Not to Love Big Brother) Reprinted
from TomDispatch.com courtesy of Haymarket Books," Class, Race and Corporate Power: Vol. 6 : Iss. 1 , Article 2.
DOI: 10.25148/CRCP.6.1.007545
Available at: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/classracecorporatepower/vol6/iss1/2
Exploring the Shadows of America’s Security State (Or How I Learned
Not to Love Big Brother) Reprinted from TomDispatch.com courtesy of
Haymarket Books
Abstract
This piece has been reprinted from TomDispatch.com and is an adapted and expanded version of the
introduction to Alfred W. McCoy's new book: In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of
U.S. Global Power (Haymarket Books, 2017). Thanks to TomDispatch.com, Dr. McCoy and Haymarket Books
for allowing us to reprint this here.
Keywords
US Empire, Rise of China, US Foreign Policy
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
This article is available in Class, Race and Corporate Power: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/classracecorporatepower/vol6/iss1/2
In the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks, Washington pursued its elusive enemies across 
the landscapes of Asia and Africa, thanks in part to a massive expansion of its intelligence 
infrastructure, particularly of the emerging technologies for digital surveillance, agile drones, and 
biometric identification. In 2010, almost a decade into this secret war with its voracious appetite 
for information, the Washington Post reported that the national security state had swelled into a 
“fourth branch” of the federal government -- with 854,000 vetted officials, 263 security 
organizations, and over 3,000 intelligence units, issuing 50,000 special reports every year. 
Though stunning, these statistics only skimmed the visible surface of what had become history’s 
largest and most lethal clandestine apparatus. According to classified documents that Edward 
Snowden leaked in 2013, the nation’s 16 intelligence agencies alone had 107,035 employees and 
a combined “black budget” of $52.6 billion, the equivalent of 10% percent of the vast defense 
budget. 
By sweeping the skies and probing the worldwide web’s undersea cables, the National 
Security Agency (NSA) could surgically penetrate the confidential communications of just about 
any leader on the planet, while simultaneously sweeping up billions of ordinary messages. For its 
classified missions, the CIA had access to the Pentagon’s Special Operations Command, with 
69,000 elite troops (Rangers, SEALs, Air Commandos) and their agile arsenal. In addition to this 
formidable paramilitary capacity, the CIA operated 30 Predator and Reaper drones responsible 
for more than 3,000 deaths in Pakistan and Yemen. 
While Americans practiced a collective form of duck and cover as the Department of 
Homeland Security’s colored alerts pulsed nervously from yellow to red, few paused to ask the 
hard question: Was all this security really directed solely at enemies beyond our borders? After 
half a century of domestic security abuses -- from the “red scare” of the 1920s through the FBI’s 
illegal harassment of antiwar protesters in the 1960s and 1970s -- could we really be confident 
that there wasn’t a hidden cost to all these secret measures right here at home? Maybe, just 
maybe, all this security wasn’t really so benign when it came to us. 
From my own personal experience over the past half-century, and my family’s history 
over three generations, I’ve found out in the most personal way possible that there’s a real cost to 
entrusting our civil liberties to the discretion of secret agencies. Let me share just a few of my 
own “war” stories to explain how I’ve been forced to keep learning and relearning this 
uncomfortable lesson the hard way. 
 
On the Heroin Trail 
 
After finishing college in the late 1960s, I decided to pursue a Ph.D. in Japanese history 
and was pleasantly surprised when Yale Graduate School admitted me with a full fellowship. But 
the Ivy League in those days was no ivory tower. During my first year at Yale, the Justice 
Department indicted Black Panther leader Bobby Seale for a local murder and the May Day 
protests that filled the New Haven green also shut the campus for a week. Almost 
simultaneously, President Nixon ordered the invasion of Cambodia and student protests closed 
hundreds of campuses across America for the rest of the semester. 
In the midst of all this tumult, the focus of my studies shifted from Japan to Southeast 
Asia, and from the past to the war in Vietnam. Yes, that war. So what did I do about the draft? 
During my first semester at Yale, on December 1, 1969, to be precise, the Selective Service cut 
up the calendar for a lottery. The first 100 birthdays picked were certain to be drafted, but any 
dates above 200 were likely exempt. My birthday, June 8th, was the very last date drawn, not 
number 365 but 366 (don’t forget leap year) -- the only lottery I have ever won, except for a 
Sunbeam electric frying pan in a high school raffle. Through a convoluted moral calculus typical 
of the 1960s, I decided that my draft exemption, although acquired by sheer luck, demanded that 
I devote myself, above all else, to thinking about, writing about, and working to end the Vietnam 
War. 
During those campus protests over Cambodia in the spring of 1970, our small group of 
graduate students in Southeast Asian history at Yale realized that the U.S. strategic predicament 
in Indochina would soon require an invasion of Laos to cut the flow of enemy supplies into 
South Vietnam. So, while protests over Cambodia swept campuses nationwide, we were huddled 
inside the library, preparing for the next invasion by editing a book of essays on Laos for the 
publisher Harper & Row. A few months after that book appeared, one of the company’s junior 
editors, Elizabeth Jakab, intrigued by an account we had included about that country’s opium 
crop, telephoned from New York to ask if I could research and write a “quickie” paperback 
about the history behind the heroin epidemic then infecting the U.S. Army in Vietnam. 
I promptly started the research at my student carrel in the Gothic tower that is Yale’s 
Sterling Library, tracking old colonial reports about the Southeast Asian opium trade that ended 
suddenly in the 1950s, just as the story got interesting. So, quite tentatively at first, I stepped 
outside the library to do a few interviews and soon found myself following an investigative trail 
that circled the globe. First, I traveled across America for meetings with retired CIA operatives. 
Then I crossed the Pacific to Hong Kong to study drug syndicates, courtesy of that colony’s 
police drug squad. Next, I went south to Saigon, then the capital of South Vietnam, to investigate 
the heroin traffic that was targeting the GIs, and on into the mountains of Laos to observe CIA 
alliances with opium warlords and the hill-tribe militias that grew the opium poppy. Finally, I 
flew from Singapore to Paris for interviews with retired French intelligence officers about their 
opium trafficking during the first Indochina War of the 1950s. 
The drug traffic that supplied heroin for the U.S. troops fighting in South Vietnam was 
not, I discovered, exclusively the work of criminals. Once the opium left tribal poppy fields in 
Laos, the traffic required official complicity at every level. The helicopters of Air America, the 
airline the CIA then ran, carried raw opium out of the villages of its hill-tribe allies. The 
commander of the Royal Lao Army, a close American collaborator, operated the world’s largest 
heroin lab and was so oblivious to the implications of the traffic that he opened his opium 
ledgers for my inspection. Several of Saigon’s top generals were complicit in the drug’s 
distribution to U.S. soldiers. By 1971, this web of collusion ensured that heroin, according to a 
later White House survey of a thousand veterans, would be “commonly used” by 34% of 
American troops in South Vietnam. 
None of this had been covered in my college history seminars. I had no models for 
researching an uncharted netherworld of crime and covert operations. After stepping off the 
plane in Saigon, body slammed by the tropical heat, I found myself in a sprawling foreign city of 
four million, lost in a swarm of snarling motorcycles and a maze of nameless streets, without 
contacts or a clue about how to probe these secrets. Every day on the heroin trail confronted me 
with new challenges -- where to look, what to look for, and, above all, how to ask hard questions. 
Reading all that history had, however, taught me something I didn’t know I knew. Instead of 
confronting my sources with questions about sensitive current events, I started with the French 
colonial past when the opium trade was still legal, gradually uncovering the underlying, 
unchanging logistics of drug production. As I followed this historical trail into the present, when 
the traffic became illegal and dangerously controversial, I began to use pieces from this past to 
assemble the present puzzle, until the names of contemporary dealers fell into place. In short, I 
had crafted a historical method that would prove, over the next 40 years of my career, 
surprisingly useful in analyzing a diverse array of foreign policy controversies -- CIA alliances 
with drug lords, the agency’s propagation of psychological torture, and our spreading state 
surveillance. 
 
The CIA Makes Its Entrance in My Life 
 
Those months on the road, meeting gangsters and warlords in isolated places, offered 
only one bit of real danger. While hiking in the mountains of Laos, interviewing Hmong farmers 
about their opium shipments on CIA helicopters, I was descending a steep slope when a burst of 
bullets ripped the ground at my feet. I had walked into an ambush by agency mercenaries. 
While the five Hmong militia escorts whom the local village headman had prudently provided 
laid down a covering fire, my Australian photographer John Everingham and I flattened 
ourselves in the elephant grass and crawled through the mud to safety. Without those armed 
escorts, my research would have been at an end and so would I. After that ambush failed, a CIA 
paramilitary officer summoned me to a mountaintop meeting where he threatened to murder my 
Lao interpreter unless I ended my research. After winning assurances from the U.S. embassy that 
my interpreter would not be harmed, I decided to ignore that warning and keep going. 
Six months and 30,000 miles later, I returned to New Haven. My investigation of CIA 
alliances with drug lords had taught me more than I could have imagined about the covert 
aspects of U.S. global power. Settling into my attic apartment for an academic year of writing, I 
was confident that I knew more than enough for a book on this unconventional topic. But my 
education, it turned out, was just beginning. 
Within weeks, a massive, middle-aged guy in a suit interrupted my scholarly 
isolation.  He appeared at my front door and identified himself as Tom Tripodi, senior agent for 
the Bureau of Narcotics, which later became the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). His 
agency, he confessed during a second visit, was worried about my writing and he had been sent 
to investigate. He needed something to tell his superiors. Tom was a guy you could trust. So I 
showed him a few draft pages of my book. He disappeared into the living room for a while and 
came back saying, “Pretty good stuff. You got your ducks in a row.” But there were some things, 
he added, that weren’t quite right, some things he could help me fix. 
Tom was my first reader. Later, I would hand him whole chapters and he would sit in a 
rocking chair, shirt sleeves rolled up, revolver in his shoulder holster, sipping coffee, scribbling 
corrections in the margins, and telling fabulous stories -- like the time Jersey Mafia boss 
“Bayonne Joe” Zicarelli tried to buy a thousand rifles from a local gun store to overthrow Fidel 
Castro. Or when some CIA covert warrior came home for a vacation and had to be escorted 
everywhere so he didn’t kill somebody in a supermarket aisle. 
Best of all, there was the one about how the Bureau of Narcotics caught French 
intelligence protecting the Corsican syndicates smuggling heroin into New York City. Some of 
his stories, usually unacknowledged, would appear in my book, The Politics of Heroin in 
Southeast Asia. These conversations with an undercover operative, who had trained Cuban exiles 
for the CIA in Florida and later investigated Mafia heroin syndicates for the DEA in Sicily, were 
akin to an advanced seminar, a master class in covert operations. 
In the summer of 1972, with the book at press, I went to Washington to testify before 
Congress. As I was making the rounds of congressional offices on Capitol Hill, my editor rang 
unexpectedly and summoned me to New York for a meeting with the president and vice 
president of Harper & Row, my book’s publisher. Ushered into a plush suite of offices 
overlooking the spires of St. Patrick’s Cathedral, I listened to those executives tell me that Cord 
Meyer, Jr., the CIA’s deputy director for covert operations, had called on their company’s 
president emeritus, Cass Canfield, Sr. The visit was no accident, for Canfield, according to an 
authoritative history, “enjoyed prolific links to the world of intelligence, both as a former 
psychological warfare officer and as a close personal friend of Allen Dulles,” the ex-head of the 
CIA. Meyer denounced my book as a threat to national security. He asked Canfield, also an old 
friend, to quietly suppress it. 
I was in serious trouble. Not only was Meyer a senior CIA official but he also had 
impeccable social connections and covert assets in every corner of American intellectual life. 
After graduating from Yale in 1942, he served with the marines in the Pacific, writing eloquent 
war dispatches published in the Atlantic Monthly. He later worked with the U.S. delegation 
drafting the U.N. charter. Personally recruited by spymaster Allen Dulles, Meyer joined the CIA 
in 1951 and was soon running its International Organizations Division, which, in the words of 
that same history, “constituted the greatest single concentration of covert political and 
propaganda activities of the by now octopus-like CIA,” including “Operation Mockingbird” that 
planted disinformation in major U.S. newspapers meant to aid agency operations. Informed 
sources told me that the CIA still had assets inside every major New York publisher and it 
already had every page of my manuscript. 
As the child of a wealthy New York family, Cord Meyer moved in elite social circles, 
meeting and marrying Mary Pinchot, the niece of Gifford Pinchot, founder of the U.S. Forestry 
Service and a former governor of Pennsylvania. Pinchot was a breathtaking beauty who later 
became President Kennedy’s mistress, making dozens of secret visits to the White House. When 
she was found shot dead along the banks of a canal in Washington in 1964, the head of CIA 
counterintelligence, James Jesus Angleton, another Yale alumnus, broke into her home in an 
unsuccessful attempt to secure her diary. Mary’s sister Toni and her husband, Washington Post 
editor Ben Bradlee, later found the diary and gave it to Angleton for destruction by the agency. 
To this day, her unsolved murder remains a subject of mystery and controversy. 
Cord Meyer was also in the Social Register of New York’s fine families along with my 
publisher, Cass Canfield, which added a dash of social cachet to the pressure to suppress my 
book. By the time he walked into Harper & Row’s office in that summer of 1972, two decades of 
CIA service had changed Meyer (according to that same authoritative history) from a liberal 
idealist into “a relentless, implacable advocate for his own ideas,” driven by “a paranoiac distrust 
of everyone who didn’t agree with him” and a manner that was “histrionic and even bellicose.” 
An unpublished 26-year-old graduate student versus the master of CIA media manipulation. It 
was hardly a fair fight. I began to fear my book would never appear. 
To his credit, Canfield refused Meyer’s request to suppress the book. But he did allow the 
agency a chance to review the manuscript prior to publication. Instead of waiting quietly for the 
CIA’s critique, I contacted Seymour Hersh, then an investigative reporter for the New York 
Times. The same day the CIA courier arrived from Langley to collect my manuscript, Hersh 
swept through Harper & Row’s offices like a tropical storm, pelting hapless executives with 
incessant, unsettling questions. The next day, his exposé of the CIA’s attempt at censorship 
appeared on the paper’s front page. Other national media organizations followed his lead. Faced 
with a barrage of negative coverage, the CIA gave Harper & Row a critique full of unconvincing 
denials. The book was published unaltered. 
 My Life as an Open Book for the Agency 
 
I had learned another important lesson: the Constitution’s protection of press freedom 
could check even the world’s most powerful espionage agency. Cord Meyer reportedly learned 
the same lesson. According to his obituary in the Washington Post, “It was assumed that Mr. 
Meyer would eventually advance” to head CIA covert operations, “but the public disclosure 
about the book deal... apparently dampened his prospects.” He was instead exiled to London and 
eased into early retirement. 
Meyer and his colleagues were not, however, used to losing. Defeated in the public arena, 
the CIA retreated to the shadows and retaliated by tugging at every thread in the threadbare life 
of a graduate student. Over the next few months, federal officials from the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare turned up at Yale to investigate my graduate fellowship. The Internal 
Revenue Service audited my poverty-level income. The FBI tapped my New Haven telephone 
(something I learned years later from a class-action lawsuit). 
In August 1972, at the height of the controversy over the book, FBI agents told the 
bureau’s director that they had “conducted [an] investigation concerning McCoy,” searching the 
files they had compiled on me for the past two years and interviewing numerous “sources whose 
identities are concealed [who] have furnished reliable information in the past” -- thereby 
producing an 11-page report detailing my birth, education, and campus antiwar activities. 
A college classmate I hadn’t seen in four years, who served in military intelligence, magically 
appeared at my side in the book section of the Yale Co-op, seemingly eager to resume our 
relationship. The same week that a laudatory review of my book appeared on the front page of 
the New York Times Book Review, an extraordinary achievement for any historian, Yale’s 
History Department placed me on academic probation. Unless I could somehow do a year’s 
worth of overdue work in a single semester, I faced dismissal. 
In those days, the ties between the CIA and Yale were wide and deep. The campus 
residential colleges screened students, including future CIA Director Porter Goss, for possible 
careers in espionage. Alumni like Cord Meyer and James Angleton held senior slots at the 
agency. Had I not had a faculty adviser visiting from Germany, the distinguished scholar 
Bernhard Dahm who was a stranger to this covert nexus, that probation would likely have 
become expulsion, ending my academic career and destroying my credibility. 
During those difficult days, New York Congressman Ogden Reid, a ranking member of 
the House Foreign Relations Committee, telephoned to say that he was sending staff 
investigators to Laos to look into the opium situation. Amid this controversy, a CIA helicopter 
landed near the village where I had escaped that ambush and flew the Hmong headman who had 
helped my research to an agency airstrip. There, a CIA interrogator made it clear that he had 
better deny what he had said to me about the opium. Fearing, as he later told my photographer, 
that “they will send a helicopter to arrest me, or... soldiers to shoot me,” the Hmong headman did 
just that. 
At a personal level, I was discovering just how deep the country’s intelligence agencies 
could reach, even in a democracy, leaving no part of my life untouched: my publisher, my 
university, my sources, my taxes, my phone, and even my friends. 
Although I had won the first battle of this war with a media blitz, the CIA was winning 
the longer bureaucratic struggle. By silencing my sources and denying any culpability, its 
officials convinced Congress that it was innocent of any direct complicity in the Indochina drug 
trade. During Senate hearings into CIA assassinations by the famed Church Committee three 
years later, Congress accepted the agency’s assurance that none of its operatives had been 
directly involved in heroin trafficking (an allegation I had never actually made). The committee’s 
report did confirm the core of my critique, however, finding that “the CIA is particularly 
vulnerable to criticism” over indigenous assets in Laos “of considerable importance to the 
Agency,” including “people who either were known to be, or were suspected of being, involved 
in narcotics trafficking.” But the senators did not press the CIA for any resolution or reform of 
what its own inspector general had called the “particular dilemma” posed by those alliances with 
drug lords -- the key aspect, in my view, of its complicity in the traffic. 
During the mid-1970s, as the flow of drugs into the United States slowed and the number 
of addicts declined, the heroin problem receded into the inner cities and the media moved on to 
new sensations. Unfortunately, Congress had forfeited an opportunity to check the CIA and 
correct its way of waging covert wars. In less than 10 years, the problem of the CIA’s tactical 
alliances with drug traffickers to support its far-flung covert wars was back with a vengeance. 
During the 1980s, as the crack-cocaine epidemic swept America’s cities, the agency, as its own 
Inspector General later reported, allied itself with the largest drug smuggler in the Caribbean, 
using his port facilities to ship arms to the Contra guerrillas fighting in Nicaragua and protecting 
him from any prosecution for five years. Simultaneously on the other side of the planet in 
Afghanistan, mujahedeen guerrillas imposed an opium tax on farmers to fund their fight against 
the Soviet occupation and, with the CIA’s tacit consent, operated heroin labs along the Pakistani 
border to supply international markets. By the mid-1980s, Afghanistan’s opium harvest had 
grown 10-fold and was providing 60% of the heroin for America’s addicts and as much as 90% 
in New York City. 
Almost by accident, I had launched my academic career by doing something a bit 
different. Embedded within that study of drug trafficking was an analytical approach that would 
take me, almost unwittingly, on a lifelong exploration of U.S. global hegemony in its many 
manifestations, including diplomatic alliances, CIA interventions, developing military 
technology, recourse to torture, and global surveillance. Step by step, topic by topic, decade after 
decade, I would slowly accumulate sufficient understanding of the parts to try to assemble the 
whole. In writing my new book, In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline 
of U.S. Global Power, I drew on this research to assess the overall character of U.S. global power 
and the forces that might contribute to its perpetuation or decline. 
In the process, I slowly came to see a striking continuity and coherence in Washington’s 
century-long rise to global dominion. CIA torture techniques emerged at the start of the Cold 
War in the 1950s; much of its futuristic robotic aerospace technology had its first trial in the 
Vietnam War of the 1960s; and, above all, Washington’s reliance on surveillance first appeared 
in the colonial Philippines around 1900 and soon became an essential though essentially illegal 
tool for the FBI’s repression of domestic dissent that continued through the 1970s.     
 
Surveillance Today 
 
In the wake of the 9/11 terror attacks, I dusted off that historical method, and used it to 
explore the origins and character of domestic surveillance inside the United States. 
After occupying the Philippines in 1898, the U.S. Army, facing a difficult pacification campaign 
in a restive land, discovered the power of systematic surveillance to crush the resistance of the 
country’s political elite. Then, during World War I, the Army’s “father of military intelligence,” 
the dour General Ralph Van Deman, who had learned his trade in the Philippines, drew upon his 
years pacifying those islands to mobilize a legion of 1,700 soldiers and 350,000 citizen-
vigilantes for an intense surveillance program against suspected enemy spies among German-
Americans, including my own grandfather. In studying Military Intelligence files at the National 
Archives, I found “suspicious” letters purloined from my grandfather’s army locker.  In fact, his 
mother had been writing him in her native German about such subversive subjects as knitting 
him socks for guard duty. 
In the 1950s, Hoover’s FBI agents tapped thousands of phones without warrants and kept 
suspected subversives under close surveillance, including my mother’s cousin Gerard Piel, an 
anti-nuclear activist and the publisher of Scientific American magazine. During the Vietnam 
War, the bureau expanded its activities with an amazing array of spiteful, often illegal, intrigues 
in a bid to cripple the antiwar movement with pervasive surveillance of the sort seen in my own 
FBI file. 
Memory of the FBI’s illegal surveillance programs was largely washed away after the 
Vietnam War thanks to Congressional reforms that required judicial warrants for all government 
wiretaps. The terror attacks of September 2001, however, gave the National Security Agency the 
leeway to launch renewed surveillance on a previously unimaginable scale. Writing for 
TomDispatch in 2009, I observed that coercive methods first tested in the Middle East were 
being repatriated and might lay the groundwork for “a domestic surveillance 
state.”  Sophisticated biometric and cyber techniques forged in the war zones of Afghanistan and 
Iraq had made a “digital surveillance state a reality” and so were fundamentally changing the 
character of American democracy. 
Four years later, Edward Snowden’s leak of secret NSA documents revealed that, after a 
century-long gestation period, a U.S. digital surveillance state had finally arrived. In the age of 
the Internet, the NSA could monitor tens of millions of private lives worldwide, including 
American ones, via a few hundred computerized probes into the global grid of fiber-optic cables. 
And then, as if to remind me in the most personal way possible of our new reality, four years 
ago, I found myself the target yet again of an IRS audit, of TSA body searches at national 
airports, and -- as I discovered when the line went dead -- a tap on my office telephone at the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. Why? Maybe it was my current writing on sensitive topics 
like CIA torture and NSA surveillance, or maybe my name popped up from some old database of 
suspected subversives left over from the 1970s. Whatever the explanation, it was a reasonable 
reminder that, if my own family’s experience across three generations is in any way 
representative, state surveillance has been an integral part of American political life far longer 
than we might imagine. 
At the cost of personal privacy, Washington’s worldwide web of surveillance has now 
become a weapon of exceptional power in a bid to extend U.S. global hegemony deeper into the 
twenty-first century. Yet it’s worth remembering that sooner or later what we do overseas always 
seems to come home to haunt us, just as the CIA and crew have haunted me this last half-
century.  When we learn to love Big Brother, the world becomes a more, not less, dangerous 
place. 
